Fault-tolerant computing is a mature art whose techniques have migrated from mainframe computers to other product classes. This migration has involved tradeoffs between failure probabilities, defined availability requirements, performance implications, and product cost. [1] [2] [3] At IBM, we have incorporated fault tolerance in designing Power4 systems-servers comprised of several Power4 chips. The Power4 is an integrated system on a chip (SoC) designed for systems that initially target enterprise Unix customers and at a later date O/S 400 customers. These systems are critical to the successful operation of many organizations and operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Such a high degree of reliability, availability, and serviceability (RAS) is difficult to provide in a highly integrated SoC like the Power4 because traditional error diagnosis techniques become less workable. Therefore, achieving RAS targets for Power4-based systems requires a steady migration of IBM's mainframe S/390 RAS into Power4 system hardware and software.
Description and features
The Power4 chip, currently shipping at 1.1 and 1.3 GHz, contains two independent processor cores, a shared second-level (L2) cache, a directory for an off-chip third-level (L3) cache, and the required logic to form large symmetric multiprocessors. Figure 1 shows the chip design; it contains 174 million transistors fabricated using IBM's 0.18-micron CMOS silicon-on-insulator technology with seven-layer copper metalization.
Each Power4 processor is an out-of-order superscalar design with eight execution units:
• two fixed point, • two floating-point, • two load/store, • a branch unit, and • an execution unit that performs logical operations on the condition register.
Each processor can issue instructions to each execution unit every cycle, although the maximum instruction retirement rate is five per cycle. Each core also contains a 64-Kbyte L1 instruction cache and a 32-Kbyte L1 data cache with dual ports. Up to eight concurrent data cache misses and three instruction cache misses are possible. 
POWER4 SYSTEM DESIGN FOR HIGH RELIABILITY
The two cores share an eight-way set-associative L2 cache organized around three independent cache controllers. At 1.3 GHz, 125 Gbytes/s of data can go from the L2 cache to the two processor cores. The Power4 chip can handle a total of 12 concurrent outstanding L2 misses.
The on-chip L3 directory supports an offchip eight-way set-associative 32-Mbyte cache, which supports up to eight outstanding L3 misses. Data transfer between the L3 cache and the Power4 chip occurs at 13.9 Gbytes/s at an operating frequency of 1.3 GHz. Transfers to and from memory can occur at up to 12.8 Gbytes/s.
Four Power4 chips are mounted on a single module to form an eight-way system, as Figure 2 shows. Figure 3 (next page) shows the interconnection of four such modules to form a 32-way system. From a chip perspective, the interconnect topology is bus based; from a module perspective, it is switch based. The interconnection between modules is ring- like. Power4-to-Power4 buses, whether on or off module, operate at 650 MHz-half the processor speed. Buses to and from an off-chip L3 cache operate at 433 MHz-one-third the processor speed. You can further interconnect multiple Power4 nodes in a cluster configuration to form even larger systems.
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System reliability requirements
Power4 reliability targets include classical mean time between failure (MTBF) improvements and customer impact availability improvements, called high-impact outages (HIOs), related to recoverable and unrecoverable failures. Enhancing and adding new retry mechanisms, increasing the amount of redundant hardware, and increasing the degree of concurrent and deferred maintenance compared to prior systems have improved reliability. In fact, Power4 systems reduce the number of HIOs per year by more than a factor of 2 over predecessor systems such as the IBM eServer p680 and the IBM/SP (based on the Power3-II microprocessor).
To achieve MTBF and HIO improvements, Power4 systems have functions that support • fault masking, • internal redundancy, • error recovery, and • dynamic reconfiguration for all system elements, including the processors, system memory and caches, I/O adapters and devices, storage devices, and power and cooling elements. in Power4 systems to achieve these HIO goals. All depend on hardware functions, and most require system firmware and operating system support for the complete solution.
Cache recovery for soft errors
In Power4 CMOS technology, the ability to tolerate and mask soft errors in all caches is paramount. If cache errors were not recovered, aggregate soft-error rates (SERs) in the SRAMs would cause unacceptable customer outages. These SERs exceed the conventional intrinsic failure rate in such technology by up to a factor of 5,000. To alleviate the effect of soft errors, Power4 provides error correction at all cache levels. In the L2 and L3 caches, Power4 uses Hamming error correction code (ECC) for standard single-error correction and double-error detection.
The L1 data cache is parity protected, through inclusivity (all data in the L1 data cache is guaranteed to also be in the L2 cache) and a store-through design (all writes to the L1 data cache are also written to the L2 cache). System firmware can accomplish error recovery by flushing the affected cache line and refetching the data from the L2 cache. The Power4 has a similar recovery function for data arrays-the translation look-aside buffer and the effective-to-real address table (ERAT)-to assist and speed up the translation of addresses from effective (what the application programmer deals with) to real addresses (where the data is actually stored in memory).
For the L1 instruction cache and its ERAT, the hardware reports parity errors as if a cache miss had caused a refetch from the L2 cache. In the L2 ECC implementation, correct data is always written back into-and is then refetched from-the L2 cache. This differs from most main-memory ECC implementations. In this case, the corrected data goes to 
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Recoverable error thresholds and internal redundancy
The most likely failure event in a processor is a soft single-bit error in one of its caches. However, other events can occur, and it's important to distinguish these events from one another. For the L1, L2, and L3 caches, hardware and firmware track whether the particular ECC station corrects permanent errors beyond a certain threshold. After exceeding this threshold, the system creates a deferredrepair error log entry. The system also initiates additional runtime availability actions, such as CPU vary off (which initiates a controlled shut-down of a processor such that no information is lost) and cache line delete (which removes a faulty cache line-consecutive addresses in the cache-from service).
Both L1 and L2 caches in the Power4 chip come with spare bits in their arrays. Programmable steering logic permits access to these arrays to replace faulty bits. This programmable logic is analogous to the redundant bit steering employed in main memory as a mechanism to avoid physical repair. For the L1 and L2 caches, the steering logic is activated by built-in self-test (BIST) at power on.
The Power4 design implements L3 cache redundancy at the granularity level of a cache line. Exceeding correctable error thresholds during runtime invokes a dynamic cache-linedelete function capable of up to two deletions per L3 cache. In the rare event of solid bit errors exceeding this quantity, the cache continues to run, but the service processor issues a message calling for deferred repair. Rebooting the Power4 system without such repair places the L3 cache in bypass mode; the system then comes up with this cache deconfigured. Performance suffers without the L3 cache, but the system still operates-a more acceptable alternative than an inoperable system.
Dynamic CPU deconfiguration
Firmware records runtime error thresholds, indicating the number of corrected, permanent errors in both L1 and L2 caches. These errors become part of the system error log as deferred-maintenance service events. If the system administrator chooses, these events can invoke a runtime firmware procedure called stop_self. This procedure purges the caches of the affected processors and marks them as deconfigured to the operating system. Deconfigured processors do not respond to or cause any system events; removing these processors from the configuration provides continued system operation until a deferred repair.
Multilevel recovery
The Power4 supports noncheckstop behavior in the unlikely event of corrupt data from various sources. It does so by sending a synchronous machine-check interrupt to system software in response to load data having either a parity error from the L1 cache or an unrecoverable error from the L2 cache. The firmware's machine-check interrupt handler examines the Power4 error state and determines the appropriate response. For L1 parity, the firmware initiates recovery. For an uncorrectable error, the machine-check handler returns the address of the instruction that loaded the corrupt data. Operating system recovery involves determining the nature of the affected process and initiating user-process or partition termination, depending on whether the error damaged the kernel. Only the affected partition is terminated in a multiple-partition system.
Uncorrectable-error handling
Power4 error-handling recovery has multiple layers to maximize system availability. ECC throughout the system and bus retry (retrying an operation on a bus for which an error was detected) accomplish recovery for the bulk of anticipated errors. In the rare event that errors exceed the ECC capability, or bus retry fails to provide correct data, predecessor machines would respond with some form of system checkstop-that is, halting machine operation-to maintain data integrity. For Power4 systems, we designed the hardware, firmware, and AIX (Advanced Interactive Executive) to keep running-avoiding a hardware checkstop but maintaining data integrity. The Power4 tags corrupt data-that is, data with uncorrectable errors (UEs)-with various hardware indicators: a special uncorrectable error (SUE) syndrome in memory, a Derr signal for buses, special error packets for I/O transmissions, and so on. Figure 4 shows the sequence of events surrounding an uncorrectable error. The processor concurrently writes data to the L1 and L2 caches (step 1). An ECC station checks the data on the bus and reports it to the L1 data cache's fault isolation register (FIR) as OK (step 2). In this example, a UE occurs while the data is still in the L2 cache. When the L2 cache casts out the data to the L3 cache (step 3), an ECC station checks the data and reports a UE to the L2 FIR (step 4). The L2 FIR in turn reports the error to the service processor (step 5), which calls for a replacement of the faulty part (step 6). An ECC station writes the data into the L3 cache, which encodes it as an SUE to indicate that its error condition has already been reported to the service processor. When the L3 cache casts out the data to main memory (step 7), an ECC station notes the SUE state and records it in the L3 FIR (step 8). The SUE state inhibits the report of this change to the service processor. System error handling occurs only when corrupt data is referenced (step 9). As soon as the processor recognizes corrupt data, it signals a synchronous machine-check interrupt (step 10), indicating to the operating system the address of the instruction loading the corrupt data. In a multiple-partition system, only the partition referencing the corrupt data will have an outage. If the data error does not affect the kernel, only the user process is terminated. As with many errors, the focus is on minimizing the error's impact and keeping as much of the application operational as possible.
ECC design for handling uncorrectable errors
As data moves through the memory hierarchy, it is repeatedly checked and corrected at each level to ensure both data integrity and fault isolation. To support UE handling, all ECC stations extend conventional ECC. Any level of the hierarchy can store known corrupt data that originated outside its level, giving it a special tag for fault isolation so that on subsequent requests the data will be recognized as corrupt. The mechanism used in all Power4 ECC stations lets the ECC logic modify the check bits using a fixed algorithm before storing known corrupt data. as a stored SUE, distinct from unrecoverable double-bit errors. If a normal double-bit unrecoverable error is encountered, the ECC logic forwards the corrupt data to the next memory level, marked as an SUE with appropriate check bits. Only the initial observation of incorrect data causes fault isolation capture. The check-bit modification algorithm guarantees that an SUE stored in a location having a legitimate single-bit error will not alias as a correctable error; the SUE will still be recognized as an unrecoverable error on subsequent fetches. This SUE state inhibits reporting of previously reported error conditions.
Runtime diagnostics based on error checkers
All Power4 error-checking mechanismsincluding parity detection, ECC, and control checks-have three distinct but related attributes:
• Checkers provide data integrity.
• Checkers initiate appropriate recovery mechanisms-from bus retry based on parity error detection, to ECC correction based on hardware detection of a nonzero syndrome in the ECC logic, to firmware refreshing of certain arrays based on parity detection. • All ECC stations in Power4 data and control paths deterministically isolate physical faults based on runtime detection of each unique failure that could occur.
4,5 Figure 5 shows the error checker placement in a typical 32-way Power4 system. All error checkers contain software-readable error-capture FIRs and blocking logic so that for every detected error, only the first checker that encounters the error records it. This form of instantaneous runtime diagnostics greatly enhances other forms of diagnostic testing, such as BIST (which relies on reproducible defects rather than intermittent ones), that are often present or evident only at runtime. Runtime error diagnostics are deterministic, defining and documenting the checker's error domain at every check station. This function also allows automatic deconfiguration of a failed element without testing or recreating the failure. Diagnostic validation includes dynamically injecting intermittent error conditions during runtime to verify that the diagnostic identifies the physical component where the error resides.
Debugging solutions
To enhance system bring-up in the laboratory and to continue making forward progress in the presence of what otherwise could be catastrophic failures, Power4 systems implement hang detection in both the processor and the storage subsystems. During system bringup (before shipping the system to customers and during test), the hardware could have a fatal error that would cause the system to cease functioning-a hang. Hang detection lets the system detect that it has ceased functioning so that corrective action can be taken to circumvent the failure and avoid a catastrophic failure. Continued testing would still be possible, reducing overall test time. We adjusted the hang detection intervals so that the processor has a longer time-out than the storage unit processing the request. The idea is to force a hang error closer to the fault's actual source. This strategy allows a more accurate diagnostic call and simplifies debugging of the hang. You can think of the hang interval as an inverted triangle with the processor at the top and the I/O at the bottom.
We took advantage of Power4's processor microarchitecture to implement a hang recovery mechanism. Historically, complex out-oforder processors have encountered hang situations due to internal resources mismanagement. The hang detector in each Power4 processor, however, can distinguish whether the source of the hang is due to internal processor operations or a lost storage request. Backing up the processor and retrying the instruction stream in a slow mode, where the instructions are completed in order, permits recovery from internal processor hangs. After a predetermined time interval, the processor returns to full speed. We used this mode of hang recovery during Power4 bring-up to work around design errors.
IBM's experience with large complex systems has shown the need, under certain circumstances, for internal machine data well beyond the surgically limited FIR data needed for normal diagnostic field-replaceable unit (FRU) fault isolation. In these rare but critical situations, IBM engineers need trace arrays, debugging buses, and scan-ring dump access to determine the root cause as rapidly as possible. Power4 hardware has hardware hooks to acquire this data, if necessary. At the system level, only certain error checkersthose indicating time-outs and hangs not addressed by recovery and not having a clear FRU callout-automatically cause the long scan-ring dump to occur, complete with trace contents defined by the hardware design team. A s is always the case with recovery, there is more to do. Over time, we will be enhancing Power4-based systems with additional RAS functions. In fact, IBM has an initiative in place, called Project eLiza, to further enhance system reliability and automate the management of information systems we develop. The items included in Power4 described in this article are a start in this direction. 
IEEE Micro serves your interests
